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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

I

STATE OF UTAH
F. M . A. FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

RICHARD McKEAN and TIM- )
OTHY F. BUEHNER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.

12726

BRIEF OF APPELLANT RICHARD McKEAN
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the lower court's granting of
a Summary Judgment for Plaintiff upon Plaintiff's motion
therein.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The District Court granted Plaintiff's motion for
Summary Judgment.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this court overrule the lower
court's granting of a Summary Judgment on the basis
that the Plaintiff failed t.o show that there were no genuine issues as to any material facts nor that they were
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October 1968, Appellant Richard F. McKean was
asl':.ed by an acquaintance of his, Defendant Timothy
Buehner, to co-sign with him to enable Buehner to obtain
an automatic car wash unit for Buehner's service station.
Although Appellant McKean had no personal interest in
investing in the car wash business, he consented to cosign with Buehner on the basis of their long standing
friendship. On or about November 15, 1968, an agreement was signed between Respondent F.M.A. Leasing
and Appellant McKean and Defendant Buehner which
required McKean and Buehner to make monthly payments to F.M.A. of $296.01.
In co-signing the above lease agreement, Appellant
McKean and Defendant Buehner agreed that the latter
would be fully responsible for the management of the
c:J.r wash equipment and for the payment of the monthly
installments. Furthermore, Defendant Buehner was to
provide Appellant 1\!cKean with a monthly report of the
operations of this equipment including the receipts and
disbursements resulting from its operation. However, in
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spite of frequent requests for this report, Buehner never
provided the same to Appellant.
Some time after the signing of the lease, Appellant
McKean and Defendant Buehner entered into an oral
agreement whereby Buehner agreed to refund to McKean
the sum of $300 which was the amount McKean advanced
as a down payment on the lease. Buehner further agreed
to have McKean released from all obligations under the
lease with Respondent F.M.A. Shortly after this agreement was made, Buehner informed Appellant McKean
that he had located a prospective purchaser of the car
wash equipment, to wit: Mr. Bill Roderick. A meeting was
arranged at which Appellant McKean, Defendant Buehner, and Respondent F.M.A. were present. At this meeting
Appellant McKean stated that he had no objection to any
sale or other disposition of this car wash equipment so
long as he received the return of his initial investment
of $300 and a complete release of all liability under the
original lease with F.M.A. Respondent F.M.A. fully understood that Appellant would not agree to allow the car
wash equipment to be removed from Buehner's premises
unless McKean received a full release on the original
lease. Appellant McKean understood as a result of this
meeting that the equipment would be sold to Roderick
and that McKean would be fully released by F.M.A.
Subsequent to this meeting, Appellant McKean
learned that Respondent had not in fact sold the car wash
unit to Roderick, but that it had been leased to Roderick
with an option to purchase. This sub-lease agreement
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was not negotiated by Appellant McKean nor by Defendant Buehner but was negotiated exclusively by F.M.A.
and Roderick. At the time of these negotiations Respondent F.M.A. was aware that Appellant McKean agreed
to this sale (or sub-lease) to Roderick only upon the condition that Appellant McKean would be fully released
from his obligations under the original lease agreement
with F.M.A. That notwithstanding, Respondent F.M.A.
failed to inform Appellant McKean of the provision in
their agreement with Roderick, which stated that Respondent F.M.A. refused to discharge Appellant McKean
from any responsibility or liability under the original
lease. As a result of this failure by Respondent and based
upon the oral communications between Appellant and
Respondent, Appellant was led to believe in good faith
that he had been fully discharged from all obligations to
Respondent under this original lease agreement.
In the latter part of 1970 Respondent F.M.A. corncenced an action against Appellant McKean and Defendant Buehner to enforce the latter's obligation under the
original lease. This was Appellant's first knowledge that
his obligations under the original lease had not been discharged. Subsequently, on or about September 2, 1970
Appellant McKean received a letter from Respondent's
attorney which stated that Respondent F.M.A. would
exercise its option under the lease and consummate a sale
of the car wash equipment on or about September 3,
1970. Inasmuch as Appellant received no further notice
regarding this sale he assumed that the car wash equip-
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ment had been sold. On the basis of this information and
belief Appellant made no further attempt to mitigate
his damages by personally sub-leasing or selling the car
wash equipment. However, later Appellant discovered
that Respondent had in fact not sold the car wash equipment as stated in Respondent's letter but had rather retained the same and claimed damages against Appellant
McKean accruing after the date of the proposed sale.
Appellant therefore contends that as a result of Respondent's repeated misrepresentations and disregard for
Appellant's interest in the above transactions, Appellant
has suffered substantial damages. Appellant further contends that he has been unable to mitigate his damages
under the original lease as a result of Respondent's activities and that Appellant should be given the opportunity to have a trial on the merits in this case in order to
show further evidence of his damages and offsets. Appellant further contends that the lower court erred in granting a summary judgment in this matter because Respondent failed to show neither that there were no genuine
issues as to any material facts nor that they were entitled
to a judgment for the full amount alleged in their complaint as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS
TO ANY MATERIAL FACTS NOR THAT
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THEY WERE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The circumstances under which a summary judgment
are proper have been well defined by this Court. In
Bridge vs. Bachman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P. 2d 909,
( 1960) this Court stated:

"A summary judgment is supported only by a
showing that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 368 (See
also Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

The Court went on further and stated that "In determining the sufficiency of such showing we must view the evidence and inferences therefrom in light most favorable
to the party against whom such judgment is sought. So,
unless there is a showing that the disfavored parties cannot produce evidence which would reasonably support
a finding in their favor on a material or determinative
issue of fact, a summary judgment is erroneous." Id. at
368. See also In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293
P. 2d 682 (1956); Bullock vs. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960).
In Reliable Furniture Company vs. Fidelity and
Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398
P. 2d 685 (1965), this Court was reviewing a summary
judgment, and re-stated the well recognized principle
that in reviewing whether a summary judgment was
proper, the Supreme Court must assume the facts as the
Appellant contends them to be. (Id. at 215.) This Court
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hu<ber
in Hatch vs. Sugarhouse Finance Company,
20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P. 2d 758 (1967), that a summary
judgment was erroneously entered for the Plaintiff where
issues of fact were raised by the pleadings and counter
affidavits of the Defendant.

In the instant case, the pleadings and counter-affidavits of Appellant Richard F. McKean clearly raise several factual issues which must be determined and resolved
before judgment can be rendered in this matter. Clearly
the issue was raised whether Respondent F.M.A. by
neeoti.:iting a contract with a third party expressly or impliedly released Appellant McKean from his obligation
und8r the original lease. The possibility of this express
or implied release is even greater in light of the knowledge
which Respondent F.M.A. had that Appellant McKean
agreed to this sub-lease (which McKean thought to be
a sale) only upon the condition that McKean would be
fully released by Respondent. Appellant is entitled to
introduce further evidence of this implied release.
Furthermore, as stated by the pleadings and affidavits of the Appellant, the Appellant McKean relied
upon the Respondent's representations that Respondent
was mitigating damages by selling this automatic car
wash equipment on or about September 3, 1970 and as
a result, Appellant McKean made no further efforts to
mitigate damages. Appellant should be allowed to introduce this evidence at trial in order to receive an offset
of at least the damages accruing after this alleged sale
by Respondent.
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All of the above issues were properly raised in the
lower court by pleadings and affidavits and they clearly
raise issues of fact which constitute a defense, either
whole or in part, to the Respondent's claim for damages
in this matter. In light of these remaining material issues
of fact which were not litigated, the lower court clearly
erred in granting a summary judgment for the full amount
alleged in the Respondent's complaint. Furthermore,
upon review of the lower court's summary judgment in
this matter, as stated in the Reliable Furniture case supra,
this Court must assume the facts as Appellant contends
them to be. It follows that the lower court's summary
judgment cannot stand.
CONCLUSION
This Court has established specific standards which
must be satisfied before a summary judgment may be
properly granted. In the instant case, Appellant McKean
has clearly raised material issues of fact which he is entitled to present to a trier of facts. These issues were
properly raised by the Appellant in the lower court. The
presence of these factual issues clearly makes the lower
court's granting of a summary judgment improper in this
case.
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Appellant therefore respectfully requests this Court
to reverse the lower court's decision granting a summary
judgment and issue an order requiring the lower court
to try the factual issues which were properly raised by
the Appellant herein.
Respectfully submitted,

HUNT, WALKE::ZNTZE, Inc.

...
M. RICHARD WALKER

Attorney for Appel/,a,nt

Richard McKean

